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THE SOUTH CHINA SEA UNCLOS TRIBUNAL
AWARD 2016: WHAT IT HAS CHANGED AND
WHAT IT DOES MEAN TO INDONESIA
Damos Dumoli Agusman*
Abstract
Since The Permanent Court of Arbitration issued its award on 12 July 2016 it have raised many
controvertion. Almost all Submissions are decided in favour of the Philippines. The Award, as
expected by many scholars, is not intended to solve the core dispute of the South China Sea ‘what
maritime features belong to whom’, since the very nature of this kind of dispute is not under the
Tribunal competence. The sovereignty over disputed features shall be left to the claimant States for
the resolution. Nevertheless, the Tribunal Award has not only clarified the dispute but also partially
solve the core dispute. The legal clarification is expected to contribute to future negotiations among
the claimant States concerning the core (sovereignty) dispute. This Article attempts to identify and
describe what has been changed by the Tribunal Rulings and what has been solved. The implication
of the Ruling on Indonesia’s legal interest is also briefly discuss.
Keywords: south china sea, UNCLOS, tribunal.

I. INTRODUCTION
The South China Sea dispute is a complex and proliferated dispute.
The dispute is mainly about, and rooted in, overlapping claim over
maritime features (islands, rocks, reefs) in the South China Sea by six
countries bordering the South China Sea1 i.e. China (including Taiwan),
Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines. The dispute starts since
WW II but it has been since 1960 that the respective claim of the claimant states have been known to each other. China claims all the Spratly
Islands based on historical discovery and control. Taiwan mirrors China’s claim with some modifications. Vietnam also claims all the Spratly
Islands based on historical discovery and colonial French inheritance.
The Philippines claims some islands based on proximity and discovery/
* The author graduated from Goethe University of Frankfurt and is currently the Secretary of Directorate General for Legal and Treaties Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia. This Article is purely his academic view.
1
Many books and articles have been written about the dispute. The most popular and
recent one is writen by Bill Hayton, South China Sea: the Struggle for Power in Asia,
Yale University, 2014. Overview about this book has been written by Damos Dumoli
Agusman, Kompas, 22 November 2015.
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occupation but has abandoned its claim on the basis of ‘Paris Treaty
Box’. Malaysia claims some islands based on proximity.2
On 12 July 2016, Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Under Annex VII to
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea between the
Philippines and China (hereafter called “Tribunal’) issued a landmark
Award concerning the South China Sea dispute. The Case was launched
on 22 January 2013 when the Philippines instituted arbitral proceedings
under Article 287 and Annex VII UNCLOS. The case brought by the
Philippines in respond to the incident in 2012 where Chinese official
vessels prevented by use of force the Philippines fishermen from entering Scarborough Shoal.
The Case was defined in a cautious manner so that it only dealt
with three inter-related matters in the form of 15 Submissions. First is
about the legality under the UNCLOS 1982 of China’s claims based
on “historic rights” encompassed within its so-called “nine-dash line”.
Second, the maritime status under the Convention of certain maritime
features claimed by both China and the Philippines, whether they are
properly characterised as islands, rocks, low tide elevations, or submerged banks. Third, the activities of China by construction and fishing
has interfered with the exercise of the Philippines’ sovereign rights and
freedoms and have harmed the marine environment.
From the outset China strongly has objected the Philippines legal
move. On 19 February 2013, China has reiterated that it will neither
accept nor participate in the proceedings, by arguing that the Arbitral
Tribunal does not have jurisdiction over the case. On 7 December 2014,
China issued the Position Paper for its legal defence.3 In the Position
Paper, China stated that in regard with the South China Sea, China and
the Philippines have agreed, through bilateral instruments and the Declaration on the Conduct (DOC)4 on Parties in the South China Sea, to
For a clear description of the respective claim see, Beckman, the UN Condntion on
the Law of the Sea and the Maritime Dispute in South China Sea, 107 Am. J. Int’l L.
142 2013.
3
Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of
the Philippines, 7 December 2014, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/
zxxx_662805/t1217147.shtml.
4
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), adopted on
2
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settle their relevant disputes through negotiations. In China’s view, by
unilaterally initiating the arbitration, the Philippines has breached its
obligation under international law. Further, China also argued that the
case is about sovereignty and maritime delimitation for which China
has made declaration under Article 2985 of UNCLOS 1982 for the excluding this kind of dispute from compulsory dispute settlement. China
to some extend also revealed, albeit in ambiguous manner, its legal
position on the meaning of its controversial claim/historic rights on the
basis of 9 dash line.
China’s respond is unprecedented. China, which previously preferred to remain silent and ambiguous in term of its legal position toward the issue, has since then moved out from its silence and increasingly reveals not only its official position but also the legal foundation
underlining its maritime claim. In the same time Chinese scholars come
out with abundant legal argument in the language of international law
which tried to clarify the claim.
The Tribunal has carefully examined the China’s objections and
held public hearing in the jurisdiction and admissibility phase. On 29
October 2015 the Tribunal issued the Award on this matter and decided
that it has jurisdiction. According to the Tribunal, most of the Philippines submission are disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention. They do not constitute a dispute concerning
sovereignty over the feature, which would remain entirely unaffected
by the Tribunal’s determination, nor is this a dispute concerning sea
boundary delimitation for which are covered by the exclusion from jurisdiction under Article 298 of the Convention. There are a number of
Submission6 that the Tribunal reserved its decision on the jurisdiction
for consideration in conjunction with the merits.
4 November 2002, by ASEAN member States and China at the 8th ASEAn Summit
in Phnom Penh. The 2002 DOC contains provisions on the following: (1) peaceful
resolution of the territorial and jurisdictional disputes; (2) self-restraint in the conduct
of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability;
(3) confidence-building measures; and (4) cooperative activities.
5
Article 298 of UNCLOS 1982 provides Optional exceptions to applicability of section 2. The dispute concerning maritime delimitation may, upon declaration by the
Party, be excepted from compulsory procedure.
6
Submission 1 and 2 on historic rights claimed by China.
132
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Further, the Tribunal confirmed on the basis of Article 9 Annex VII
of the Convention that the non appearance of China before the Arbitral
Tribunal shall not constitute a bar to the proceedings. Interestingly, despite the fact that China did not sit before the bench, the Tribunal has
regarded whatever China’s official statements outside the Court rooms
as official responds that constituted rebuttal to the Philippines submisions. Thus these statements were fully considered by the Tribunal in its
deliberation and decisions.
On 12 July 2016, the Tribunal issued its final Award. Almost all
Submissions are decided in favour of the Philippines. The Award, as
expected by many scholars, is not intended to solve the core dispute
of the South China Sea i.e. ‘what maritime features belong to whom’,
since the very nature of this kind of dispute is not under the Tribunal
competence. The sovereignty over disputed features shall be left to the
claimant States for the resolution.
Nevertheless, the Tribunal Award has not only clarified the dispute
but also partially solve the core dispute. The legal clarification is expected to contribute to future negotiations among the claimant States
concerning the core (sovereignty) dispute. This Article attempts to
identify and describe what has been changed by the Tribunal Rulings
and what has been solved. The implication of the Ruling on Indonesia’s
legal interest is also briefly discussed.

II. LEGAL CLARIFIED FACTS
A. THE CONTROVERSY OF SO-CALLED “HISTORIC RIGHTS”
WITHIN 9 DASH LINE
The dispute becomes more exacerbated when China starts embracing in its legal argument the ambiguous concept of ‘9-dashed lines’,
through which China is aggressively asserting “indisputable sovereignty” to all the islands and waters enclosed by the lines. China’s so-called
“9-dash-line” (originally “11 dashes”) first promulgated by Republic of
China in 1947. No record has shown that the map has been officially
known to pubic debated until 1990’s. Nor did it become China’s argument in supporting its claim during incident with Vietnam in 1974 or
Volume 14 Number 2 January 2017
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during the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea. In 1993 during the
Workshop on Managing Conflict in South China Sea held in Surabaya,
the Chinese delegation distributed a map showing the 9 dash lines and
since then the mysterious map becomes subject to controversial debate
among scholars and commentators around the world.7 Amidst its controversy, China for the first time officially attached this map in its note
to the Commission on the Limits of Continental Shelf in 2009, protesting the join submission of Malaysia and Vietnam about their extended
continental shelf to the Commission. In 2012 China issue its passports
showing the illustrative map.
The Tribunal held public hearing on the merits of the case from 2330 November 2015 and dealt with the controversial question concerning the legality of China’s claim concerning historic rights within the
China’s 9 dash lines. At the first observation by many, it was suggested
that the Tribunal might have difficulty in determining its legality in the
absence of China’s clarification since China did not appear before the
Tribunal. However, beyond public expectation, the Tribunal is so determined that it has competence to deal with the question i.e. whether or
not there exists other maritime claims beyond UNCLOS 1982.
Before giving the answer to this question, the Tribunal has already
indicated its understanding that in one hand China claims historic rights
to the living and non-living resources in the waters of the South China
Sea within the ‘nine-dash line’, but on the other hand China does not
consider that those waters form part of its territorial sea or internal waters (other than the territorial sea generated by islands). According to
the Tribunal, such a claim would not be incompatible with the Convention insofar as the areas are within China’s exclusive economic zone
and continental shelf. However, to the extent that China’s claim to historic rights extends to areas that would be considered to form part of
the entitlement of the Philippines to an exclusive economic zone or
continental shelf, it would be at least at variance with the Convention.8
The Tribunal further declared that by acceding to the Convention
and its entry into force, any historic rights that China may have had to
the living and non-living resources within the ‘nine-dash line’ were su7
8

As explained by Prof Hasjim Djalal to the Author, 2015.
Para 232 of the Award
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perseded, as a matter of law and as between the Philippines and China,
by the limits of the maritime zones provided for by the Convention.9
The rule is without exception and has been known to all Parties since
the Convention was a package that did not, and could not, fully reflect
any State’s prior understanding of its maritime rights. Accession to the
Convention reflects a commitment to bring incompatible claims into
alignment with its provisions, and its continued operation necessarily
calls for compromise by those States with prior claims in excess of the
Convention’s limits.
The Tribunal made an interesting finding with regard to what it
understood about China’s historic rights. In the Tribunal’s view, what
China claimed as historic rights was nothing but the freedom of the
high seas that it had. Under the previous regime, nearly all of the South
China Sea formed part of the high seas. The international community
has then determined to convert the highs seas to the EEZ where China
gained a greater degree of control. Only China’s freedom to navigate
the South China Sea remains unaffected. What China enjoyed, as it has
claimed, such as navigation and trade in the South China Sea, as well as
fishing beyond the territorial sea, represented the exercise of high seas
freedoms. China engaged in activities that were permitted to all States
by international law, as did the Philippines and other littoral States surrounding the South China Sea.
From this perspective, the Tribunal is of the view that China’s ratification of the Convention did not actually extinguish historic rights
in the waters of the South China Sea. Rather, China relinquished the
freedoms of the high seas that it had previously had. In this regard, the
Tribunal tried to reformulate historic rights as understood by China in a
more accurate context.
In its dispositif paragraph the Tribunal declares that, as between the
Philippines and China, China’s claims to historic rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, with respect to the maritime areas of the
South China Sea encompassed by the relevant part of the ‘nine-dash
line’ are contrary to the Convention and without lawful effect to the
extent that they exceed the geographic and substantive limits of China’s
maritime entitlements under the Convention; and further declares that
9

Para 262 of the Award.
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the Convention superseded any historic rights, or other sovereign rights
or jurisdiction, in excess of the limits imposed therein.10 By this legal
determination the so-called ‘historic rights” as claimed by China has no
basis under the Convention.
B. MARITIME STATUS OF DISPUTED FEATURES
Second, the Tribunal proceeded to determine whether the maritime
features questioned by the Philippines are islands, rocks, reefs or just
low tide elevation. The determination of their maritime status will clarify the respective claim, especially whether or not they may generate 12
Nm territorial sea (rocks) or in addition to it 200 Nm EEZ/continental
shelf (islands), or otherwise they are not at al entitled to maritime zones
(low tide elevation)11.
Before determining this characterization, the Tribunal interpreted
the Convention with a view of seeking a guiding principle. The Tribunal considers that the Convention requires that the status of a feature be
ascertained on the basis of its earlier, natural condition, prior to the onset of significant human modification. The Tribunal will therefore reach
its decision on the basis of the best available evidence of the previous
status of what are now heavily modified coral reefs.12
The first exercise is then making distinction between low tide elevation and high tide elevation. The latter will constitute rocks or islands.
In dealing with this characterization, the Tribunal was encountered with
a technical determination of whether a particular feature is or is not
above water at high tide. The two situation will determine which were
low tide elevation and which are not. The most accurate determination,
according to the Tribunal, would be based on a combination of methods, including potentially direct, in-person observation covering an extended period of time across a range of weather and tidal conditions.
Such direct observation, however, will often be impractical for remote
features or, as in the present case, impossible where human modificaPara 1203 (B) (2) of the Award.
It has been held by various international decisions that low tide elevations are not
subject to title over islands and shall be regarded as parts of the maritime zone. The
ownership will depend on who own the maritime zones that covering the elevations.
12
Para 306 of the Award.
10
11
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tions have obscured the original status of a feature or where political
considerations restrict in-person observation. The Tribunal considers
it important that the absence of full information not be permitted to
bar the conclusions that reasonably can be drawn on the basis of other
evidence. At the same time, the limitations inherent in other forms of
evidence must be acknowledged.13
Having distinguished the low tide elevation from the high tide, the
Tribunal proceeded to the second exercise i.e. making distinction between rocks and islands by interpreting Article 121 of the Convention
concerning regime of islands.14 The critical element of Article 121 for
the Tribunal is its paragraph (3), which provides that “[r]ocks which
cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall
have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.”
In this regard, the Tribunal did not rely on the name given to them.
A feature may have “Island” or “Rock” in its name and nevertheless be
entirely submerged. Conversely a feature with “Reef” or “Shoal” in its
name may have protrusions that remain exposed at high tide. Likewise,
the fact that feature is currently not inhabited does not prove that it is
uninhabitable. The fact that it has no economic life does not prove that
it cannot sustain an economic life.15
In interpreting Article 121(3), the Tribunal drew the following
propositions:16
1. First, the use of the term “rock” does not require that a feature be
composed of rock in the geologic sense in order to fall within the
Para 321 of the Award.
Article 121 of the UNCLOS 1982
Regime of islands
1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above
water at high tide.
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in
accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory.
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall
have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.
15
Para 483 of the Award.
16
Para 504 of the Award.
13
14
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scope of the provision.
2. Second, the use of the term “cannot” makes clear that the provision concerns the objective capacity of the feature to sustain human
habitation or economic life. Actual habitation or economic activity
at any particular point in time is not relevant, except to the extent
that it indicates the capacity of the feature.
3. Third, the use of the term “sustain” indicates both time and qualitative elements. Habitation and economic life must be able to extend
over a certain duration and occur to an adequate standard.
4. Fourth, the logical interpretation of the use of the term “or” discussed above indicates that a feature that is able to sustain either
human habitation or an economic life of its own will be entitled to
an exclusive economic zone and continental shelf.
Using the above mentioned guiding principle and criteria, the Tribunal then examined the maritime feature under consideration and made
a legal determination. The most important determination is that none of
the features met criteria as ‘islands’ and thus none of them is entitled to
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. =
In a more specific determination, the Tribunal declares that some
features, despite they are naturally formed areas of land, surrounded by
water, which are above water at high tide, but they are in their natural
conditions are rocks that cannot sustain human habitation or economic
life of their own, within the meaning of Article 121(3). These are Scarborough Shoal, Gaven Reef (North), McKennan Reef, Johnson Reef,
Cuarteron Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef. They are entitled to 12 Nm territorial sea.
Some others are low-tide elevation within the meaning of Article 13
of the Convention. These are Subi Reef, Gaven Reef (South), Hughes
Reef, Mischief Reef, and Second Thomas Shoal. Generally they do not
generate entitlements to a territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, or
continental shelf and are not features that are capable of appropriation.
As for Subi Reef, Gaven Reef (South), Hughes Reef, they may be used
as the baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea because
they lie within 12 Nm of high tide features of, respectively, Sandy Cay,
Gaven Reef (North) and Namyit Island, McKennan Reef and Sin Cowe
Island.
138
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With respect to Scarborough Shoal, the Tribunal made additional
characterization to this feature by declaring that it has been a traditional
fishing ground for fishermen of many nationalities. With this newlyconfirmed status, the Tribunal thus determined that China has, through
the operation of its official vessels at Scarborough Shoal from May
2012 onwards, unlawfully prevented fishermen from the Philippines
from engaging in traditional fishing at Scarborough Shoal.
C. ACTIVITIES OF CHINA IN RECLAIMED FEATURES
The third cluster of disputes is concerning the activities of China.
The Tribunal dealt with question whether or not by construction and
fishing in the specific disputed areas China has interfered with the exercise of the Philippines’ sovereign rights and freedoms and have harmed
the marine environment.
The question is mainly about he protection and preservation of the
marine environment in the South China Sea as envisaged by the UNCLOS 1982. In this regard the Tribunal declares that China has breached
its obligations under Articles 123, 192, 194(1), 194(5), 197, and 206 of
the Convention.

III.

WHAT THE TRIBUNAL RULING HAS CHANGED

Notwithstanding the juridical fact that the Tribunal Award does
not, and is not intended to, solve the core dispute concerning title to
maritime features, the Award has changed significantly the nature of
respective claim of the claimant States over the features as well as waters in South China Sea. Although the Award, under Art 11 Annex VII
UNCLOS, shall be complied with by the parties to the dispute only,
the Tribunal interpretation of certain UNCLOS provisions has clarified
their meaning and thus removed the controversy that so far attached to
the dispute amongst other claimant States.
The first significant change is the removal of legal ambiguity underlining the overlapping claims. Not only claimant States but also all
coastal States in the regions which had suffered from the dispute have
been freed from the ambiguity of the so-called “9 dash line”. Prior to
Volume 14 Number 2 January 2017
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the Award, there was no legal explanation concerning the meaning of
the line since China’s approach to this controversial ‘historic rights’
was to keep it ambiguous. The prominent Chinese legal scholars made
it clear that as no delimitation of maritime boundaries would be possible without settling sovereignty disputes over islands and reefs in
question, thus maintaining ambiguity on the maritime claims might be
the best choice for the moment. They further stated that any attempt to
clarify the dash line would only lead to an escalation.17 This might be
the main reason why China was so reluctant to explain the legal nature
of the claim albeit being frequently sought by many States. On the other
hand, Chinese scholars might have different views thus discouraging
the Government to issue the legal position.
This ambiguity had exacerbated the complexity of the already-complicated dispute. The real picture of the dispute in South China Sea had
been mainly shadowed by this mysterious line and to some extent it
had posed stagnancy and thus barred any effort for the resolution of the
dispute. The situation became worst since China was not merely drawing the line in the map but recently also articulating and even enforcing
the line on the ground (waters). These moves have created tension and
given rise to a security dilemma18 in the region by which all claimant
States try to assert and consolidate their respective claims with a view
of diminishing other claimant claims. Occupying and reclaiming the
features are considered by them as the best mode for consolidating their
title, notwithstanding that most legal scholars will argue that this mode
will never work for acquisition of territories.
The Tribunal Award removed the line from the map and therefore
the geographical scope of the claim becomes clearer. In this regard,
the line shall no longer serve as a legal basis not only for claiming the
Fu YingWu Shicun, ‘South China Sea: How We Got to This Stage’, The National
Interest, 9 May 2016, can accessed at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/south-chinasea-how-we-got-stage-16118?page=show
18
Jervis, R. “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics vol. 30, no.2
(January 1978), pp. 167–174; and Jervis, R. Perception and Misperception in International Politics(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 58–113. See
also Agusman and Nugroho, ‘SCS Dispute: Security Dilemma Revival?”, Jakarta Post
7 March 2016, can be accessed at http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/03/07/
scs-dispute-security-dilemma-revival.html
17
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waters surrounded but also for claiming the title over the features being
disputed. The removal of the line from the picture does not necessary
mean that China has totally lost ground for claiming the features. It
does only mean that China shall seek other more legitimate basis for
claiming the features within the ambit of modes of acquisitions of territory recognized under international law. With other claimant States,
China shall reformulate the claim and adjust it to the prevailing international law taking into account those prohibited rules as interpreted by
the Tribunal.
As explained above, the Tribunal is not designed, and is not authorized by the Convention, to solve the sovereignty issues i.e. title to maritime features in South China Sea. The resolution of this very dispute
is left to the claimant States to decide. Thus, while the Award does not
touch the title over the features i.e. ‘which features belong to whom’,
it is the responsibility of claimant States to solve the dispute through
peaceful means. The Tribunal Award only paves a way for further solution. The claimant States shall further proceed to negotiate in a view of
finding solution. They are free to choose the mode of dispute settlement
either through direct negotiations or through third party settlement including judicial settlement through international courts.
In International Law, territorial dispute or title to ‘islands’ is considered as one of the most complicated case. The history has recorded
that this kind of dispute is hardly solved through negotiations between
the claimant States, because the absolutist positions and sovereign pride
over their claimed territories would normally close the room for the
abandonment of the claim. In the negotiation, the claimant states normally will encounter with the win-loose dilemma, which are irreconcilable.19 It clearly explains why in practice the dispute over title to territories is increasingly, albeit with reluctantly, settled through a third party
settlement mechanism or otherwise to keep the dispute unresolved.20
Southeast Asian countries have a better experience in settling disDamos Dumoli Agusman, “Conflict Prevention and the Rule of Law: Reassessing the South China Sea Conundrum in the 21st Century – Progress and Prospect,”
presented at the 4th MIMA South China Sea Conference 2015, Kuala Lumpur, 8-9
August 2015.
20
Id.
19
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putes over title to territory, whether through negotiations or through a
third party settlement. Thailand and Cambodia settled their land title
dispute over the Temple of Preah Vihear (ICJ/1962)21, Indonesia and
Malaysia over Sipadan and Ligitan Islands (ICJ/2002)22, Malaysia and
Singapore over Pedra Branca (ICJ/2008)23, and also the case by their
predecessors between the Netherlands and the USA over the Island of
Palmas/Miangas (Arbitration/1928).24 On the other hand, on the Northeast Asian scope, there is no record of dispute over territory is settled
through third party and yet there is a number of title disputes left unresolved.25
The second significant change is concerning the geographical maritime scope of the respective claims. As the Tribunal confirms that none
of the disputed features is entitled to EEZ/continental shelf, the status
of waters becomes clearer. Before the Award, no legal determination
whether the features they claim might generate maritime zone up to
200 Nm. They tended to regard the features they claim as fully entitled
islands and thus attaching to their claim the assumption, as a default,
that the features had their own EEZ/continental shelf.
Since there is no feature under consideration entitled to EEZ/continental shelf, EEZ or continental shelf in South China Sea is only derived and drawn from the mainland of the respective claimant States.
The configuration of the maritime zones has changed significantly and
given space to high seas in between opposite claimant States. Claimant States which adjacent one to another shall delimit their territorial
Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Jugdment of
15 June 1962, available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=284&p1=3
&p2=3&case=45&p3=5.
22
Case concerning Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia v.
Malaysia), available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/102/10570.pdf.
23
Case concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks
and South Ledge (Malaysia v. Singapore), available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/
files/130/14492.pdf.
24
Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Island of Palmas case (Netherlands v.
USA), 4 April 1928, Volume II pp. 829-871, available at: http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_II/829-871.pdf.
25
For instance: the Liancourt/Dokdo between Japan and South Korea; Senkaku/Diaoyudau Island between Japan and China, and the dispute concerning maritime features in South China Sea.
21
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sea and EEZ/continental shelf and to be effected through agreements.
Some features, with the 12 Nm territorial sea, will scatter and lie within
the EEZ/continental shelf drawn from the main coast and some of them
within the high seas.

Courtesy of Mr Bensurto

The third significant change, and arguably is the most delicate one,
is that the core dispute has been partially solved. The Tribunal finds
that Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are low-tide elevations
not capable of appropriation, and they are within the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the Philippines. By this ruling, the
two features are not subject to be disputed since they form part of the
maritime zone and they lie uncontested within the Philippines EEZ/
Continental Shelf. In this regard, the maritime status of the two features
is hereby determined as belong to the Philippines and shall be taken out
from the ‘disputed box’.
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IV. IMPLICATION OFTHETRIBUNALAWARD ON INDONESIA
It has been a long standing position that Indonesia is not part of the
dispute26. Indonesia is not claimant States in the South China Sea dispute, simply because Indonesia does not claim any feature in the area
and no state claims any feature within Indonesia’s South China Waters
waters.27
Some doubts had been raised in 1990’s whether or not China claimed
the Natunal island following the disclosure of China’s 9 dash lines in
1993. The doubt has been removed since Foreign Minister Qian Qichen
in 1995, in respond to Foreign Minister Ali Alatas question, clarified
that China has no claim over Natuna islands.28 Similar confirmation has
also been acquired by Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi from Foreign
Minister Wang Yi in their informal meeting on 3 June 2016 in Paris.
The complexity of the dispute to some extent has confused Indonesian pubic about the position of Indonesia vis a vis the dispute. The
position of Indonesia has thus been understood differently and diversely amongst Indonesian public. The 9-dashed-line, one of which encroached the waters in the vicinity of Indonesia’s Natuna Islands, had
(mis) led some officials to assert that there was an overlapping claim
between Indonesia and China.29 Actually there is no geographical datum attaching to the 9 dash line so no one could be sure where exactly
the lines are located. Apparently, some have argued that it encroached
part of Natuna waters and came to a conclusion that, as if, Indonesia
had dispute with China over maritime in the waters. This fact has lent
to a convincing reason that Indonesia is a claimant state.
The position has been recently reiterated by President Jokowi during the ASEAN
Summit in Kuala Lumpur, 22 November 2015.
27
Natuna Archipelago is within Indonesia’s waters but geographically also a part of
South China Sea.
28
Official correspondence is on file with the author.
29
The debate was on the for following a public statement by Mr. Fahru Zaini, Senior
Official of the Coordinating Ministery for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs (Menkopolhukam): “China has claimed Natuna waters as their territorial waters. This arbitrary claim is related to the dispute over Spratly and Paracel Islands between China
and the Philippines. This dispute will have a large impact on the security of Natuna
waters”, see Evan Laksmana, “Why there is no ‘new maritime dispute’ between Indonesia and China,” the Strategist, 4 April 2014, available at: http://www.aspistrategist.
org.au/why-there-is-no-new-maritime-dispute-between-indonesia-and-china/.
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Claiming that Indonesia is a claimant state simply on the ground
that it has overlapping maritime claim with China, if any, in the South
China Sea is not very convincing for the following reasons. First, the
notion ‘claimant states’ mostly refers to overlapping claim over title
to islands, not to overlapping claim to maritime zones. Indonesia has
overlapping maritime zones in entire bordering areas with all its neighbours and hardly been referred to as ‘claimant state’. Indonesia was a
claimant State when it had dispute since 1969 with Malaysia over Sipadan and Ligitan Islands, which had been then solved by ICJ in 2002
in favour of Malaysia.
Second, whether Indonesia has overlapping claim with China could
not be determined simply and merely by the fact that there exists one
of the dash line within Indonesia’s waters. In this regard, Indonesia has
persistently protested the lines including President Joko Widodo who
recently stated that Chinese 9 dash line has no legal basis.30 Likewise,
many States have make similar protest to the China’s 9 -dash line-map.
In this circumstance, considering that the map has violated UNCLOS
1982, the problem arising from the line should not be regarded as either
between claimant states or between bilateral contexts only, but it should
be the problem of all parties to UNCOS 1982.
In order to constitute that there is an overlapping claim, China
should have a good basis for making a proper claim that legitimately
opposes to Indonesia’s claim over the maritime zone. On the part of Indonesia, it has under UNCLOS 1982 a legitimate claim over 200 Nm of
EEZ/continental measured from its baselines. On the part of China, it is
hardly tenable to assert its claim on the basis of 9 dash line since the line
has no foundation in international law. In this circumstance, asserting
that there is a dispute between Indonesia and China over the maritime
zone is legally unfounded.
The ambiguity of the 9 dash line that appeared in Natuna waters
had to some extent created uncomfortable situation between the two
Countries. Although both Parties succeeded in managing the ‘differSee “Indonesia’s President says China has no legal claim to South China Sea: Yomiuri,” The Straits Times, 23 March 2015, available at: http://www.straitstimes.com/
asia/se-asia/indonesias-president-jokowi-says-china-has-no-legal-claim-to-southchina-sea-yomiuri.
30
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ences’, and China’s approach tends to shelve the issue undiscussed, the
potential tension was not fading away. Indonesia persistently lodged its
official protest to the China’s 9 dash line map and kept asking about the
meaning of the line.
Until recently, China had only put the line on its map and rarely executed the line on the ground. In 2013 China apparently started articulating its claim on the basis of its line in the part of Indonesia. Some incidents occurred in Natuna waters where Chinese fishing vessels were
encountered by Indonesian legal enforcement. The incidents were then
being managed discreetly without public exposure. Following the new
approach pursued by President Joko Widodo since his office in 2014,
particularly with his strongest measures against IUU fishing, the massive legal enforcement against illegal fishing by the new Administration
has resulted three consecutive arrests of Chinese fishing vessels in Natuna waters (within the 9 dash line) in the period of March-June 2016
and created open and diplomatic tension between the two Countries.
The diplomatic interactions between the two Governments in handling the incident brought about a new argument to the ‘historic rights’.
Having being silent on the ‘mysterious 9 dash line claim’, it was for the
first time China made an unprecedented open and public claim that it
has “differences’ (instead of ‘dispute”) with Indonesia in Natuna waters. China introduced a new claim in the old casing called “traditional
fishing ground”31. Again the claim is stated unexplained by Chinese authority.
Fortunately, the incidents occurred in the time when the Tribunal
was at its session. As explained above, the Tribunal Award has confirmed that the line as well as any so-called ‘historic rights’ outside the
Convention is not valid. It declares that the Convention superseded any
historic rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, in excess of the
limits imposed therein. In a specific argument, the Tribunal has clearly
expressed its view that no such historic rights extends to EEZ or continental shelf.32 The ruling constitutes a sweeping formula for supersedThe notion “Traditional Fishing Ground” raised by China in Natuna warters is
discussed by M. Taylor Fravel in “Traditional Fishing Grounds and China’s Historic
Rights Claims in the South China Sea”, Maritime Awarnes Project, July 11, 2016
32
Para 239 of the Award.
31
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ing what China asserted as “traditional fishing ground” in Indonesia’s
Natuna EEZ.
The controversy arising from the line has since the Tribunal ruling
apparently faded away from the public debate. The question then arises
whether the Award may be invoked by Indonesia in order to prevent
China from making any claim on the basis of the 9 dash line. In this
regard, there is no doubt that the award shall be complied with by the
parties to the dispute.33 Indonesia is not the party to the dispute and as
such is not entitled to invoke the Award. Traditional approach however
suggests that the judicial decisions such as the Award of the Tribunal
may enter into jurisprudence (case law) and thus could be invoked by
States other than the Parties to the dispute. It this regard, the Award
binds other States by virtue of jurisprudence (case law).
Nevertheless the Author would prefer to argue beyond this traditional approach and in favour of the view that Indonesia may invoke the
Award directly.34 The Tribunal in dealing with this particular case is not
only making adjudication to the Parties, but also interpreting the provisions of UNCLOS 1982 particularly Article 55-75 concerning EEZ and
Article 121 concerning the regime of islands. As a party to the UNCLOS 1982, Indonesia is bound by its provisions. Since the provisions
have been interpreted by the Tribunal, Indonesia shall be bound by the
provisions as interpreted by the Tribunal including the provisions that
superseded historic rights/9 dash line. Arguing that the interpreted provisions only bind the parties to the dispute would be indefensible and
could create legal chaotic. It would be unsound to argue that the 9 dash
line is invalid in the Philippines waters by virtue of the Award but in the
same time remains valid or undecided in the Natuna waters.
Therefore, the Award removes doubt concerning status of Indonesia
as non claimant State. The Award confirmed that no overlapping claim
may arise between Indonesia and China in Natuna waters. In this regard,
even before the Tribunal issuing its Award, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Retno Marsudi of Indonesia has make it clear that in the Natuna
Article 11 Annex VII, UNCLOS 1982.
Damos Dumoli Agusman, “International Norms and Rules: Lesson Learned from
Indonesia”, at the Second Manila Conference on the South China Sea”, 3 – 4 August
2016.
33
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Volume 14 Number 2 January 2017

147

Jurnal Hukum Internasional

waters Indonesia has overlapping maritime zone only with Vietnam and
Malaysia, so to exclude China.35 In Indonesia’s view, the Award merely
confirms its long established understanding concerning the line.
From the law of the sea perspective, there would be a potential maritime claim involving Indonesia in the South China Sea if there was
island entitled to 200 maritime zone lie within less than 400 Nm from
Indonesian outermost island i.e. Natuna island. One of the features under Tribunal consideration is Cuarteroon Reef, which is about 377 Nm
from Natuna island. Fortunately, the Tribunal finds that the Reef is a
rock which is not entitled to 200 Nm maritime zone and thus cannot
overlap waters within Natuna maritime zone. The Tribunal has therefore removed the uncertainty arising from Cuarteroon Reef.
Another possible overlapping claim on the UNCLOS-friendly basis
had also been raised by Chinese Scholar, Xue Manyi36, who argued
that the Vanguard Bank (claimed by China but occupied by Vietnam)
which located in a distant of 185 Nm from Natuna may constitute overlapping maritime zone with Indonesia in Natuna waters. The argument
came out in respond to the incident of 19 March 2016 when Indonesia’s
Coastguard arrested Chinese fishing vessel in Natuna waters in a distant of about 76 Nm from Vanguard Bank. This kind of argument has
however been overruled by the Tribunal Award. The status of Vanguard
Bank is not bigger than the features under Tribunal consideration and
therefore it is hardly entitled to maritime zone

V. CONCLUSION
The Tribunal Award as summary explained above has been considered as an unprecedented landmark judicial decision that has changed
significantly the configuration of dispute in South China Sea. Albeit not
solving the real core dispute, the Award at least has successfully clarified the dispute, put the distinguishable elements in the proper setting,
and presented the dispute in a clearer picture. Put it in Mr Bensurto’s
The Annual Press Statement of the Indonesia Minister for Foreign Affairs, 7 January 2016. It can be accessed at http://www.kemlu.go.id/en/pidato/menlu/Pages/TheAnnual-Press-Statement-of-the-Indonesian-Minister-for-Foreign-Affairs-2016.aspx
36
Xue Manyi, Phoenix Magazine, 22 March 2016.
35
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words, the Award has successfully unlocked the gridlock37 in South
China Sea.
The Tribunal apparently did not only adjudicate the case before it
but also exercise its authority under UNCLOS 1982 to interpret the
provisions of the Convention relevant to the case. By doing so, the Tribunal has provided clarification to some provisions that until recently
their meaning had been debated. The interpretation of the Tribunal of
the Convention apparently becomes the most important aspect in this
Award since the dispute is not merely concerning the interest of the parties to the dispute but also affects the interest of other claimant States as
well as other interested States.
The Award has significantly changed the configuration of the dispute
in South China Sea. First it removed the ambiguity of so called ‘historic
rights within 9 dash line’ claimed by China by declaring that the line is
not compatible with the UNCLOS 1982. Second, it clarified maritime
features by providing sweeping ruling, on the basis of its interpretation
of Article 121 UNCLOS 1982, that none of them is entitled to generate the maritime zone (EEZ/continental shelf) up to 200 Nm. The two
distinguished but interrelated rulings have perfectly removed distorted
claims and thus narrowed the geographical scope of the dispute.
It is also argued that in fact the Tribunal Award has partially solved
the core (sovereignty) dispute. By declaring the Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal (located within the Philippines EEZ) as low tide
elevation, the ruling has ended the contention concerning title to these
features. The two are not capable for appropriation and therefore taken
out from the list of disputed features. On the other hand, the newlydetermined status of these feature poses complexity about its enforcement on the ground. China has carried out reclamation and constructing
airstrip in Mischief Reef. The remain presence of China in the Reef is as
such constituting violation the Award and might create possible tension
between the partied to the dispute.
Indonesia is not a claimant State to the dispute and has persistently
opposed to any discourse that there exists overlapping maritime claim
Henry Bensurto, “15 Paths to Peace: Unlock the Gridlock in SCS”, paper presented
at the Second Manila Conference on the South China Sea”, 3 – 4 August 2016.
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with China. The Tribunal Award especially on its ruling that annulling
the 9 dash line is therefore nothing but confirming this long standing
position. On the other part, the Award has also removed possible doubt
about whether or not there exists feature in nearby that might possibly
overlap the Natuna waters. By finding that none of the features is eligible to generate EEZ/continental shelf, the Award confirms that none
of them will possibly encroach the Natuna waters.
As Indonesia is bound by the provisions of the UNCLOS 1982, it
is also automatically bound by the provisions as interpreted by the Tribunal. Thus Indonesia may capitalize the Award for its legal defence in
dealing with Natuna waters. In this circumstance Indonesia is a “lucky
beneficiary” of the Award.
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